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Abstract 
This study examines the hypothesis that foreign aid dilutes the positive role of taxation on political 
governance. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments and 53 
African countries for the period 1996-2010. For more policy options, the dataset is disaggregated 
into fundamental characteristics of African development based on income levels, legal origins, 
natural resources and landlockedness. While the hypothesis is invalid in baseline Africa, low 
income and English common law countries of the continent, the research cannot conclude on its 
validity for other fundamental characteristics of development. Policy implications, caveats and 
directions for future research are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
This research investigates linkages between taxation, foreign aid and political governance 
in Africa within the framework of the Eubank (2012) hypothesis which has increased the 
confidence of the Somaliland government and reignited the heated debate on aid and political 
governance. According to the Eubank hypothesis, in the absence of foreign aid, political 
accountability is likely to increase because taxpayers are only willing to pay their taxes in exchange 
for it. This Eubank hypothesis which is based on Somaliland, may fail in other African countries 
because of over-reliance on foreign aid. In theory, domestic governments that substantially depend 
on foreign aid for income may also be associated with a culture in which citizens are prone to 
paying less tax. Given that ‘old habits die hard’, less dependence on aid or threats of foreign aid 
withdrawal may only result in the deterioration of political rights (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2017). It is also important to note that the political accountability in Somaliland did not come 
overnight. Hence, governments need to be consistently accountable to citizens before they can win 
their confidence and have them pay more tax to support government expenditure. Whereas foreign 
aid significantly contributes to the composition of total revenue within African countries (Cai et 
al., 2018; Diakite et al., 2019), Somaliland is not eligible for Official Development Assistance 
because it is not recognised by the International Community as a sovereign nation. Hence, unable 
to access foreign aid, the government of the country has had to negotiate with business leaders and 
citizens for financial support and in return provide better democracy, accountability and political 
stability.  
Recently, Somaliland’s minister of energy and minerals (Hussein Abdi Dualeh) openly 
professed during an African mining conference that Somaliland was better without foreign aid and 
did not even need it: “That is a blessing in disguise. Aid never developed anything…Aid is not a 
panacea, we’d rather not have it….How many African countries do you know that developed 
because of a lot of aid? It’s a curse. The ones that get the most aid are the ones with the 
problems….We’ve been left to our own devices. We are our own people and our own guys. We pull 
ourselves up by our own bootstraps. We owe absolutely nothing to anybody. We would not change 
hands with Greece today. We have zero debt” (Stoddard, 2014). Before Eubank, the ‘Bottom 
Billion’ and ‘Dead Aid’ by Collier (2007) and Moyo (2009) respectively had also received 
tremendous feedbacks from policy making and academic circles.  
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 Collier has postulated that because most aid-recipient countries are fragile, weak in 
governance, inter alia, aid handled through the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Program 
has not had the desired effect. According to this narrative, aid-disbursement mechanisms have not 
been effective because of four main traps: (i) landlocked with bad neighbors, (ii) conflicts, (iii) 
management and dependence on natural resource, and (iv) weak governance in small countries. 
The thesis further sustains that the Bottom Billion in poverty are benefiting less on development 
strategies based on adapting ODAs to a certain benchmark of donor Gross National Income (GNI). 
The narrative is also broadly in accordance with the position that foreign aid promotes a ‘regional 
public bad’ and there appears to be no ‘regional public good’ effect offsetting the ‘public bad’ 
emanating from arms race scenarios in neighboring states (Collier & Hoeffler, 2007).  
 Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’ is another accomplished representation that has reignited polemics on 
the appealing effects of development assistance. Her book, which emphasizes that aid has 
augmented dependency, corruption and poverty in Africa has also received many reactions from 
policy makers and scholars. Whereas, her thesis has been partially supported by a plethora of recent 
literature using updated data (Banuri, 2013; Marglin, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Asongu, 2012a; 
Asongu & Jellal, 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Krause, 2013; Asongu, 2014a; Titumir & Kamal, 2013; 
Monni & Spaventa, 2013), there is also some moderate consensus on the unsoundness of some of 
her positions. Accordingly, the classic questions she addresses (for example, the relationship 
between aid and accountability) and some of her criticisms of the way she uses aid to support her 
arguments (e.g. the rate at which the coincidence between low growth rate and high flows are 
juxtaposed for evidence that the former is most likely the origin of the latter). These have been 
used by her opponents and/or defenders of foreign aid.  Whereas this narrative does not concern 
humanitarian and emergency relief assistance, there have been spates of responses among which 
the two arguments merit some emphasis. First, Sachs (2009) has argued that foreign aid is 
necessary at the tender stage of development and has presented two emotional anti-theses. First, 
in his opinion, Moyo does not have the moral values to advocate her position because she was 
awarded scholarships to study at the top world universities (Oxford and Harvard) and later in life 
thinks it is wrong to give a $10 aid to an African child for an anti-malaria bed net.  Second, the 
book substantially fails to consider stark realities like, the universal need of help at one point in 
life in one way or another. Second, Bill Gates (an American business magnate now philanthropist) 
has taken the anti-thesis a stride further by qualifying ‘Dead Aid’ as a ‘promotion of evil’. 
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According to him, Moyo’s position is morally repugnant because she appears neither to know what 
aid is doing nor much about development assistance.  
 The Eubank (2012) Somaliland-based hypothesis has also been celebrated with the award 
of the best paper from the Journal of Development Studies in 2013. According to him, the 
dependence of the state on local tax revenues provides taxpayers with a substantial leverage to 
demand from government more accountable political institutions and better representation.  This 
thesis has crucial policy relevance in Africa because Somaliland is ineligible for development 
assistance, but has relatively less inter-state conflict and more political accountability.  It is 
interesting to note that the hypothesis is based on literature without any empirical assessment. 
Hence, putting some figures to the facts as this paper aims to do, would take the debate to a further 
height and enhance policy guidance on the validity of the hypothesis in the African continent. 
Indeed, the theoretical foundations of the debate are profoundly engrained in the history of 
economic thought. According to the narrative, the hypothesis originated from negotiations 
between autocratic governments who were in need of tax revenues (to survive inter-state wars) 
and citizens who were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater public service 
delivery and more government accountability (Moore, 2008; Eubank, 2012).  
 The principal contribution of this study to the literature is to investigate the Eubank 
Somaliland-based hypothesis in the context of Africa. The research assesses the validity of the 
postulation that in the absence of foreign aid, there is a more appealing or positive relationship 
between tax revenues and political governance4. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the connections among aid, institutions and development that are relevant to the context 
of the paper. In Section 3, the study discusses the data and outlines the methodology. Section 4 
covers the empirical analysis. The research concludes with Section 5.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4 “For years, studies of state formation in early and medieval Europe have argued that the modern, representative 
state emerged as the result of negotiations between autocratic governments in need of tax revenues and citizens who 
were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater government accountability. This article presents 
evidence that similar dynamics shaped the formation of Somaliland’s democratic government. In particular, it shows 
that government dependency on local tax revenues – which resulted from its ineligibility for foreign assistance – 
provided those outside the government with the leverage needed to force the development of inclusive, representative 
and accountable political institutions” (Eubank, 2012, p.1).  
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2. Aid, institutions and development  
 The interesting literature on aid and development in Africa has substantially documented 
the poor quality of institutions to be one of the main causes of poverty. Notably, high corruption, 
political instability, the absence of property rights, regulatory environments unfriendly to 
investment, unappealing conditions for contract enforcement, and weak courts (Easterly, 2005). 
According to Easterly, in order for poverty to be mitigated, more advanced countries have to 
promote credible institutions and political governance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Knack, 2001; 
Alesina & Weder, 2002; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005; Jellal & Bouzahzah,  2012; Asongu, 
2012b,2013a; Asongu & Jellal, 2013). The extensive literature on the interconnection between aid 
and institutions has centered around three main themes for over half a century. First, many have 
assessed the interesting concern as to whether or not more aid is granted to countries with better 
institutions. Second some investigations apply to the anxiety of how foreign aid affects the quality 
of institutions in recipient countries. Third other examinations look at the challenging 
preoccupation of how aid can be used as an instrument for the improvement of institutions in 
recipient countries.  
 The positioning of the paper on the Eubank hypothesis is consistent with the second strand 
above. As we have already highlighted, much scholarly attention has been devoted to investigating 
how aid affects the quality of institutions essentially because government expenditure originating 
from local taxes is far below foreign aid and the latter decreases government dependence on local 
tax revenues and weakens the quality of institutions (Asongu, 2013a). The latter effect converges 
with the Eubank hypothesis on political governance. Whereas there is already a solid consensus 
on the appealing relationship between tax dependency and political governance (Jensen & 
Wantchekon, 2004), the incidence of development assistance on the quality of institutions has been 
subject to intense debate (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Asongu & Jellal, 2013). Hence, by extending 
the underlying hypothesis, this paper also complements an extensive literature that has already 
documented the theoretical and empirical foundations of the hypothesis (Morton, 1994; Mahon, 
2004; Moore, 2008; Timmons, 2005; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009). 
 In light of the above, whereas the relation between political governance and revenue 
bargaining has been covered in the literature, to the best of our knowledge the absence of a study 
that has been dedicated to the whole African continent is a sound justification to examine the 
Eubank hypothesis. Many of the studies have partially or fully concluded that development 
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assistance should be limited in the continent, so that Africa should be left to chart its own course 
of development (Morton, 1994; Collier, 2007; Moyo, 2009). The State’s dependence on local tax 
revenues generally leads to better provision of public services and enforcement of property rights 
(Timmons, 2005). This hypothesis on revenue bargaining in political governance has been 
confirmed in Latin America (Mahon, 2004) and in later studies on domestic institutions (Mahon, 
2005). A narrative also verified and broadly validated in Ghana (Prichard, 2009), China (Bernstein 
& Lu, 2008) and contemporary developing nations (Moore, 2008).  
 The above scope is consistent with a growing strand of the political economy literature 
suggesting a rethinking of aid-based development models. The Amin (2013) stance on the 
possibility of neocolonial interest at the center of grand aid is in accordance with the position of 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on Africa’s entrapment in a web of large scale colonial matrices of power 
and with Kindiki (2011) on the urgent imperative for Africa to strategically overcome its 
dependence on international wheels of power.  According to Amin, development should not be 
reduced to acceptance or refusal of the Washington consensus or what donors think is good for the 
African continent. He is joined by Obeng-Odoom (2013) on the position that there is genuine need 
for a through process in which real African needs are clearly articulated.  
 The highlighted Eubank (2012) hypothesis is discussed in more detail before the empirical 
analysis. According to the author, the theoretical foundations substantially originate from 
government’s dependence on local tax revenues. Hence, the government is obliged to make 
political concessions in terms of governance and accountability in exchange for tax income. The 
adage of ‘no taxation without representation’ clearly justifies this compromise between taxation 
and political leadership because it procures for the electorate the leverage of asking for greater 
political representation, voice and accountability. Since the thesis is more relevant in states that 
lack natural resources, the study should improve scholarly understanding of how governments can 
improve the climate for investment by means of credible accountable and representative 
institutions. The narrative further shows that under financial stress, the trade-off between taxation 
and political concessions is the most optimal means of collecting tax income. Thus, the hypothesis 
of Somaliland is a new theoretical illustration of the relation between political accountability and 
tax income in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In summary, verifying the hypothesis 
improves how much we know already about foreign aid as an instrument that disrupts the 
solidification of representative institutions due to poor revenue bargaining (or taxation in exchange 
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for improvements in political governance). But, essentially the most appealing justification for 
investigating the hypothesis is a request for further research by Eubank himself. He has warned 
that the findings should not be construed as relevant to Africa unless they are backed by empirical 
validity.  
 
3.1.1 Dependent, independent and control variables therefrom 
The study investigates a panel of 53 African countries with data from the Development Indicators 
of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010. The focus on Africa is to extend the debate on the 
effect of foreign aid on institutions by Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu (2012a, 2013a), and 
Asongu & Jellal (2013)5. The choice of this periodicity is because political governance indicators 
are only available from the year 1996. The data consists of three year averages in non-overlapping 
intervals (NOI) to mitigate any short-run disturbances6. There are at least three advantages to the 
use of data average to (a) fulfill a primary condition for the employment of a GMM strategy (N>T) 
(Tchamyou et al., 2019); (b) restrict over-identification (difference between instruments and 
endogenous explaining variables) or instrument proliferation, such that the number of instruments 
is less than the number of cross-sections in post-estimation diagnostic tests (Tchamyou & Asongu, 
2017); and (c) mitigate potential business cycle disturbances (Islam, 1995).   The original dataset 
is based on yearly observations and the three-year averages are an arbitrary choice. With the three-
year averages, estimated coefficients are interpreted as short-run effects (Batuo et al., 2010). 
In the light of the above, the use of three-year averages enables us to exploit more degrees 
of freedom while at the same time limiting the potential for instrument proliferation from GMM 
regressions (Efobi et al., 2019). Such instrument proliferation substantially biases estimated 
coefficients. Hence, a delicate balance is needed between the advantage of exploiting more degrees 
of freedom and the shortcoming of biasing estimated coefficients if T is too large (T being the 
number of data points in each cross- section). For instance, the use of two-year data averages 
results in instrument proliferation. This narrative on the need to strike a delicate balance between 
                                                          
5 For more insights into the heated debate on the incidence of foreign aid on corruption and/or institutional quality, 
please refer to Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu (2012a, 2013a), and Asongu & Jellal (2013).  Accordingly, Asongu 
(2012a) has invalidated the Okada & Samreth (2012) results in Africa. In response to criticisms arising therefrom, he 
has further used conditional (Asongu, 2013a) and indirect channels (Asongu & Jellal, 2013) to fully and partially 
confirm his findings respectively.  
6 We have five-three year NOIs: 1996-1998; 1999-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007 & 2008-2010.  
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instrument proliferation and desire to exploit degrees of freedom in the choice of the order of non-
overlapping interval is consistent with recent empirical literature (Asongu, 2014b).  
The dependent variable is political governance (voice and accountability and political 
stability). Political governance within the context of the study is defined as the election and 
replacement of political leaders: “The first concept is about the process by which those in authority 
are selected and replaced (Political Governance): voice and accountability and political stability” 
(Andres et al., 2015, p. 1041). The constituent variables are in line with the definition of political 
governance in Kaufmann et al. (2010) and Andrés et al. (2015). To these constituent indicators the 
study adds a composite indicator of political governance that is obtained through principal 
component analysis (PCA) in section 3.2.1 below.  
Criticisms might arise on the source of World Governance Indicators (WGI) because it 
limits the periodicity from 1996-2010 and consists of data normalised on a yearly basis. Hence, 
other governance- related data from other sources (Polity IV, Freedom House, and ICRG 
[International Country Risk Guide]) could be presented as an opportunity to extend the observation 
period considerably. The research addresses these concerns in three ways. First, as emphasised 
above, the study has used the World Bank measurement of political governance which consists of 
‘voice and accountability’ and ‘political stability/no violence’. Second, the constraint of a short-
time span is consistent with the adopted empirical GMM estimation strategy (where N or the 
number of cross- sections is large and T is small)7. Third, to the best of our knowledge, Polity IV 
and Freedom House indicators are also yearly measurements. Moreover the latter set of indicators 
displays very low relative variability. The conception of the former (Polity IV) has varied with 
time. It was designed originally as a proxy for the durability of political systems. In later years, 
however, the concept has been broadened in analytical scope to incorporate ‘regime type’ 
concerns.  
It is worth clarifying that the WGI of the World Bank reports individual and aggregate 
indicators of governance for more than two hundred territories and countries in six dimensions, 
notably: “voice and accountability” and political stability/no violence (reflecting political 
governance); government effectiveness and regulatory quality (denoting economic governance) 
and corruption-control and the rule of law (representing institutional governance). These aggregate 
governance indicators entail a combination of views from a substantial number of enterprises, 
                                                          
7 N refers to the number of cross-sections whereas T denotes the number of periods in every cross-section.  
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experts and citizen survey respondents in developing and industrial countries. The indicators are 
combined from a variety of institutes, non-governmental organisations, think-tanks, private sector 
firms and international organisations.  While the first component of political governance which is 
relevant to this study has been defined above, “The second has to do with the capacity of 
government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic Governance): 
regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no means least, regards the 
respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them 
(Institutional Governance): rule of law and control of corruption” (Andres et al., 2015, p. 1041). 
 Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the first main independent variable of interest 
(Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013). The research uses three main ODA indicators 
for robustness purposes, notably: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA 
from Multilateral Donors (MD), and NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
countries. Whereas the first is used in the empirical section, the second and third are employed for 
robustness checks to assess the consistency of results. It is important to note that the form of aid 
investigated here is financial development assistance. Accordingly, making this distinction is 
important for policy orientation (Martinussen, 1997; Degnbol-Martinussen &  Engberg-Pedersen, 
2003). The second main independent variable of interest is the proxy for taxation: Total tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP (Jellal & Asongu, 2013).  
 Consistent with the aid-development literature, the study controls for press freedom, public 
investment and inflation. Accordingly, the theoretical and empirical foundations of the investment 
and fiscal behavior channels have been substantially documented in the aid literature (Rostow, 
1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Reichel, 1995; Boone, 1996; Gomane et al., 
2003; Mosley et al., 2004 ; Larrain & Tavares, 2004; Addison et al., 2005; Easterly, 2005; Bird, 
2007; Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008; Morrissey, 2012; Benedek et al., 2012; Jellal & 
Asongu, 2013). Accordingly, the theoretical underpinnings of foreign aid are fundamentally 
needed to bridge the financial gap (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966). Foreign aid is 
necessary to boost public investment (Easterly, 2005). Asongu & Jellal (2003) have used fiscal 
behaviour and investment mechanisms to assess the effect of foreign aid on corruption (Asongu & 
Jellal, 2013). While the research expects press freedom and public investment to increase political 
governance, high inflation (especially in consumer prices) should have the opposite effect. The 
expected signs of the control variables are broadly consistent with recent governance and foreign 
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aid literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2016b). The study also controls for the unobserved 
heterogeneity in terms of time-effects.  
 
3.1.2 Categorization of countries for consistency and robustness checks 
 In order to improve the subtlety of the analysis, the richness of our dataset allows us to 
subdivide the panel into various characteristics that are fundamental to foreign aid: income-levels, 
legal origins, natural resources and openness to the sea. These characteristics have been recently 
documented as instrumental to foreign aid (Asongu, 2014a). This categorization is in line with 
recent African institutional literature (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2014b). 
 First, the intuition for legal origins has foundations in the law literature (La Porta et al., 
1998; La Porta et al., 1999) that has been recently used in the African literature (Asongu, 2014b). 
Classification of this category is in line with La Porta et al (2008, p. 289). Second, countries that 
are not open to the sea have lower political governance because there is an institutional price for 
being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007). Third, there are two justifications for controlling for wealth-
effects (1) it is very likely that economic prosperity has an incidence on political governance, 
especially when the fruits of the prosperity are not evenly distributed and (2) income-levels are 
instrumental in the quality of governance in Africa (Asongu, 2012b). Classification of countries 
in this category is with the help of the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of 
the World Bank.  
 Fourth, the study uses petroleum-exporting countries as the main criterion for the natural 
resource category. In the classification of this category, several concerns arise. (1) The 
qualification of countries in this category may be time-dynamic due to: (a) recent discovery of 
petroleum or (b) a considerable decline in oil exports. (2) There are some countries with similar 
macroeconomic characteristics as petroleum-exporting countries (e.g. Botswana with diamonds). 
To tackle these concerns, the research takes a minimalist approach by (a) including only states for 
which exports have been petroleum-dominated in the sampled countries for more than a decade 
and (b) limiting the resource-category strictly and exclusively to countries that export petroleum. 
Accordingly, countries exporting petroleum for which such exports constitute at least 10% of 
annual GDP are considered as petroleum-exporting in the light of the above criteria. The resource 
categorization approach has been used in the attendant African comparative literature (Weeks, 
2012; Asongu et al., 2019).  
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 In the classification of countries above, a country could fall within many categories at the 
same time because no constraints of categorical priority are imposed. Therefore a country may be 
in more than one category as long as it has the necessary features that are relevant for being 
identified with the category in question.  
 The definition of variables, summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation 
analysis and categorization of countries are detailed in the appendices: Appendix 1, Appendix 2, 
Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively. From the summary statistics, it can be inferred that 
plausible estimated relationships could be obtained because of the reasonable degree of variation 
in the indicators. The correlation analysis has two purposes: (i) to mitigate concerns of 
multicollinearity in the same specification and (ii) to confirm the degree of substitution between 
political governance and foreign aid variables. Moreover, the degree of substitution (0.541) 
between public investment and tax revenue does not pose any substantial issue of multicollinearity. 
The outliers displayed by the summary statistics on the governance indicators do not 
significantly influence the findings. While theoretically governance indicators from the World 
Bank range from -2.5 (worst performance) to +2.5 (best performance), some issues in data 
collection may arise. For instance, with regard to political stability/no violence, this is the case 
with: (i) Somaliland from 2004 to 2010 where the minimum values are lower than -2.5, (ii) the 
Domestic Republic of Congo in 1998 where the minimum value is -3.056, and (iii) Sudan in 2010 
where values for 2009 and 2010 are respectively -2.646 and -2.700. While in the estimation process 
Somaliland is not considered because of missing observations in other variables, the other three 
outliers in political stability do not significantly affect the findings. Whereas this explanation 
extends to the political governance indicator which has a minimum value of -3.204, it does not 
apply to voice and accountability because its minimum and maximum values are within the World 
Bank range.  
 
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal component analysis  
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 There could be some redundancy in information because of the high degree of correlation 
in voice and accountability and political stability constituting political governance. Therefore the 
study employs Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to mitigate the dimensions of the political 
governance variables. The PCA has been widely employed to reduce a large set of highly 
correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PCs) 
that denote a substantial proportion in the variability of the initial dataset. The criterion used to 
reduce the dimensions of the variables is to retain only PCs with eigenvalues that are greater than 
one or the mean (Kaiser, 1974; Jolliffe, 2002; Tchamyou, 2017, 2019a). In this light, the first PC 
in Table 1 below has an eigenvalue of 1.659 and represents about 82 percent of information from 
the constituent indicators. This first PC is the political governance indicator (Polgov).  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for the Political Governance index (Polgov) 
      
Principal  Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion(s) Cumulative  Eigen Value(s)  
Components     Proportion(s)  
 VA PS    
First P.C 0.707 0.707 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second P.C -0.707 0.707 0.170 1.000 0.340 
      
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice and Accountability. PS: Political Stability. P.C: Principal Component.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique: system GMM  
 There are many appealing sides and one principal setback in using dynamic panel 
estimation in comparison to other cross-country analyses (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008; 
Asongu, 2013b; Tchamyou, 2019b). The main arguments for using the dynamic system GMM are 
that it: (1) mitigates the biases of the difference estimator in small samples, (2) does not eliminate 
cross-country differences and (3) controls for endogeneity in all regressors (Oluwatobi et al., 2018; 
Agoba et al., 2019). However, the principal downside of this approach is the employment of data-
averages such that estimated coefficients are interpreted as short-run effects and not long-run 
impacts (Batuo et al., 2010). Hence, based on this empirical underpinning, the Eubank hypothesis 
is being investigated in the short-run.  
 The two equations below in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure.  
titititititititititi PIFATTAPGPG ,,7,6,5,4,3,21,10,                       (1)          
 
14 
 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi ATATTTAAPGPGPGPG                     
)()()()()( 1,,11,,71,,61,,5   tititttitititititi PPIIFF                                (2) 
  
 where ‘t’ represents the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. PG  is Political governance; A
, Foreign aid; T , Tax revenues; AT , interaction between Foreign aid (A) and Tax revenues (T); 
F , Press freedom; I , Inflation; P , Public investment; i is a country-specific effect;  t  is a 
time-specific constant and  ti ,  an error term. It should be noted that the conditions for employing 
a GMM estimation strategy are satisfied because we have used three-year NOI: N>T (53>5) 
(Tchamyou et al., 2018). 
 The procedure consists of jointly estimating the equations in levels with those in first 
difference, hence, exploiting all the orthogonal conditions between error term and the lagged 
endogenous variable. Consequently, lag levels of the regressors are used as instruments in the 
difference equation and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the level equation.  
Preference is given to system GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Fosu & 
Abass, 2019) as opposed to difference GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991) in accordance with recent 
literature (Bond et al., 2001, pp. 3-4; Asongu, 2013c, p. 49)8. In specifying the equations, a two-
step procedure is preferred to  one-step because it controls for heteroscedasticity. In order to 
validate the models, two tests are used as information criteria: the autocorrelation test with a null 
hypothesis on the absence autocorrelation in the residuals and; the Sargan overidentifying 
restrictions (OIR) test with a null hypothesis for the validity of instruments. In a bid to avoid the 
proliferation of instruments in the Sargan OIR test, the study ensures that instruments are less than 
the number of cross-sections in almost all the regressions. The study does not control for time-
effects in certain specifications only to void issues of exact multicollinearity and significant 
autocorrelation tests.  
 With GMM, one would normally expect a deeper lag structure with more than one lag. In 
the context of this paper, when the lag structure in the GMM specification is increased, while the 
                                                          
8 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the initial 
conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown to 
perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially consistent with 
standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical application. Hence 
we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth research”. Bond et al.  
(2001, pp. 3-4).  
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results do not change significantly, the AR(2) test as an information criterion becomes ‘not 
applicable’.  
 
3.2.3 Information criteria for validity of underlying hypothesis  
 Before presenting the results, it is important to discuss the information criteria for the 
validity of underlying hypothesis. Accordingly, the Eubank hypothesis is valid with a substitution 
effect, which we discuss in two strands: the mainstream criteria and insights from Brambor et al. 
(2006). 
 First, on the standard criteria, in accordance with Tchamyou and Asongu (2017) and 
Osabuohien and Efobi (2013, p. 299), a negative interaction effect implies a substitution impact. 
On the other hand, a positive interaction effect means that aid and taxation are complementary in 
improving political governance.  
 Second, Brambor et al. (2006) have provided guidelines on how to avoid some pitfalls in 
mainstream interpretation of interaction variables. We are consistent with some of the criteria by 
incorporating all constitutive variables in some specifications while at the same time controlling 
for concerns of multicollinearity in other specifications. However, while the joint test (Wald) for 
the combined significance of constitutive variables has been consistently provided, the 
interpretation of significance in the marginal effects has not been extended to graphs for the 
following reason. For the graphs to really make sense economically, we need some range of the 
modifying variable (see Footnote 14 of Brambor et al., 2006).  While the effective number of 
presidential candidates used in Brambor et al. (2006) may vary from 1 to 6 in the real world (Figure 
3, page 76), the range of foreign aid to GDP may not really apply to the Somaliland based 
hypothesis because the country is receiving zero official development assistance. It should be 
noted that while a graph should logically help in determining the range of the modifying variable 
(foreign aid) for which the interactive marginal effect holds, the motivation of the exposition is 
‘foreign aid versus no foreign aid’ and not the ‘thresholds of foreign aid for which the Eubank 
hypothesis holds’.  
It is also worthwhile to highlight contemporary taxation and aid. The effects of taxation 
and foreign aid on the dependent variables are not contemporaneous. This is essentially because 
the specifications consist of regressing the dependent variables in period ‘t’ on independent 
variables of lagged periods. Hence, in the system GMM specification, in order to exploit all the 
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orthogonality conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and the error term, lagged levels 
of the regressors are employed as instruments in the difference equation and lagged differences of 
the regressors employed as instruments in the level equation.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis, Discussion and Policy Implications 
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 2 below presents baseline regressions. For each of the governance variables, while 
the first two specifications control for multicollinearity, the last specification incorporates the 
Brambor et al. (2006) caution of including all constitutive terms. Based on the results, the 
following could be established. First, foreign aid positively affects political governance, taxation 
is appealing for political governance, and the interaction between taxation and aid improves 
political governance. Evidence of a complementary effect or absence of a substitution effect 
further implies the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in the baseline regressions, contrary to Asongu 
(2015)9. Second, the models are valid because the null hypotheses of the autocorrelation and 
Sargan OIR are overwhelmingly rejected. The findings are not biased by issues of instrument 
proliferation in the over-identifying restrictions because the number of instruments is substantially 
lower than the number of cross-sections (countries). Third, the significant control variables have 
the expected signs: stable inflation increases political governance while press freedom has the 
opposite effect. Stable inflation is likely to increase political governance because it provides 
enabling conditions for the peaceful and non-violent election and replacement of political leaders. 
The inference is premised on the fact that rising food prices can influence violent-related changes 
to political regimes10. When interpreting the signs of the press-freedom estimated coefficients, it 
                                                          
9 It is important to note that the current exposition steers clear of Asongu (2015) in at least four dimensions: use of 
data averages, restriction of identification, extension to fundamental characteristics of African development and 
interpretation of results as short-term effects.  
10 “In retrospect, the rapid inflation in global food prices since 2000 and its acceleration between 2007-08 has shown 
that price shocks can pose significant threats to political stability in the developing world. “We will take to the streets 
in demonstrations or we will steal,” a 30-year old woman said in 2008 as she queued outside a bakery in Egypt. 
Demonstrations and riots linked to consumer prices took place in over 30 countries between 2007-08. The Middle 
East witnessed titled, “Irregular Use of Limbe City Council Property, 13 food riots in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Yemen. In Ivory Coast, thousands marched to the home of President Laurent Gbagbo chanting: “ we are hungry”, 
“life is too expensive”, “you are going to kill us”… etc Similar demonstrations ensued in many other African 
countries, including Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mozambique, Mauritania, Cameroon and Guinea. In Latin 
America, violent clashes over rising food prices occurred in Guatemala, Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico 
and the Haitian prime minister was even toppled following food riots. In Asia, people took to the streets in Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Thailand, India and the Philippines. Even North Korea experienced an incident in which market women 
gathered to protest against restrictions on their ability to trade in food” (Asongu, 2012c, pp. 49).  
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is important to note that Freedom House, from which the data is obtained, reports press freedom 
values in decreasing magnitude. Hence, countries enjoying the highest levels of press freedom 
have the lowest reported values of political governance (Andrés & Asongu, 2013, p. 674). A 
possible reason for inflation increasing political governance is because it is relatively stable across 
samples. For example, the median inflation rate without Zimbabwe is 5.43%.  
In Tables 3-4 below, Eubank’s hypothesis is rejected in Low income and English common 
law countries. No decisions are taken for their Middle income and French civil law counterparts 
respectively. Specifications of the models are sound (instruments less than cross-sections) and the 
estimated models also robust (null hypotheses of the information criteria overwhelmingly 
rejected). Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Baseline regressions (Africa) 
          
 African Countries  
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.813*** 0.797*** 1.070*** 0.889*** 0.841*** 0.591*** 0.860*** 0.904*** 0.936*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.294** -0.248 -0.313 -0.133 -0.124 0.539*** -0.205** -0.135* 0.071 
 (0.034) (0.151) (0.271) (0.411) (0.536) (0.009) (0.011) (0.093) (0.917) 
Aid (NODA) 0.004 --- 0.009 0.003** --- 0.0009 0.006*** --- 0.008 
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 (0.143)  (0.334) (0.029)  (0.816) (0.000)  (0.459) 
Tax revenues  0.007** 0.006 0.002 -0.0005 -0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.004* 0.004 
 (0.042) (0.151) (0.725) (0.747) (0.476) (0.588) (0.005) (0.061) (0.340) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.000 --- 0.000 -0.000 --- 0.0001* -0.0001 
  (0.355) (0.971)  (0.449) (0.801)  (0.078) (0.636) 
Press Freedom --- --- 0.001 --- --- -0.014*** --- --- -0.004 
   (0.753)   (0.000)   (0.613) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0002 --- --- -0.0002 --- --- -0.0001 
   (0.813)   (0.550)   (0.875) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.008 --- --- -0.005 --- --- 0.002 
   (0.728)   (0.403)   (0.918) 
          
Times Effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.448) (0.492) (0.462) (0.428) (0.433) (0.512) (0.278) (0.319) (0.887) 
Sargan OIR  (0.115) (0.104) (0.224) (0.564) (0.172) (0.595) (0.792) (0.692) (0.286) 
Wald (Joint) 106.36*** 93.65*** 458.15*** 491.5*** 266.1*** 1564.4*** 129.0*** 99.19*** 1901.9*** 
Instruments  12 12 18 15 15 19 15 15 19 
Countries  41 41 30 41 41 30 41 41 30 
Observations  151 151 100 151 151 100 151 151 100 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: 
Overidentifying Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject 
the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-
values in brackets.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Income levels (System GMM with Total Aid) 
          
 Panel A: Low Income Countries 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.856*** 0.858*** 0.971*** 0.833*** 0.940*** 0.526*** 0.941*** 1.016*** 0.714*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.339*** -0.195* -0.318 -0.159 -0.019 0.364 -0.260** -0.147 0.764 
 (0.000) (0.089) (0.231) (0.435) (0.958) (0.287) (0.017) (0.177) (0.453) 
Aid (NODA) 0.008** --- 0.012 0.004*** --- 0.008 0.009*** --- 0.0009 
 (0.010)  (0.222) (0.000)  (0.474) (0.000)  (0.977) 
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Tax revenues  0.007** 0.002 0.008 -0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.002 -0.0006 -0.003 
 (0.031) (0.615) (0.419) (0.760) (0.727) (0.571) (0.716) (0.918) (0.880) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.0002* -0.0001 --- 0.000 -0.0003 --- 0.0001*** 0.0002 
  (0.074) (0.816)  (0.679) (0.524)  (0.006) (0.875) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.0008 --- --- -0.015** --- --- -0.013** 
   (0.798)   (0.012)   (0.044) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.0003 --- --- -0.001 
   (0.857)   (0.674)   (0.698) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.002 --- --- -0.003 --- --- -0.005 
   (0.927)   (0.780)   (0.855) 
          
Times Effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.132) (0.147) (0.996) (0.515) (0.620) (0.777) (0.178) (0.188) (0.895) 
Sargan OIR  (0.620) (0.527) (0.475) (0.793) (0.258) (0.270) (0.836) (0.715) (0.205) 
Wald (Joint) 58.93*** 47.79*** 7119.1*** 133.3*** 36.30*** 305.15*** 127.4*** 119.11*** 360.79*** 
Instruments  12 12 18 15 15 19 15 15 19 
Countries  24 24 20 24 24 20 24 24 20 
Observations  87 87 64 87 87 64 87 87 64 
          
          
 Panel B: Middle Income Countries 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.767*** 0.804*** 1.001* 1.039*** 1.070*** 0.306 0.804*** 0.921*** 0.379 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.106) (0.000) (0.000) (0.509) 
Constant -0.096 -0.097 -0.381 -0.103 -0.090 1.184*** -0.064 -0.025 2.902 
 (0.352) (0.122) (0.723) (0.255) (0.250) (0.002) (0.489) (0.926) (0.485) 
Aid (NODA) -0.001 --- 0.034 -0.0003 --- -0.001 0.004 --- -0.140 
 (0.759)  (0.723) (0.896)  (0.974) (0.629)  (0.639) 
Tax revenues  0.005** 0.004* 0.004 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.004** 0.003 -0.021 
 (0.011) (0.055) (0.718) (0.035) (0.189) (0.999) (0.042) (0.191) (0.611) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- -0.000 -0.000 --- 0.000 0.000 --- 0.000 0.003 
  (0.984) (0.991)  (0.993) (0.914)  (0.808) (0.582) 
Press Freedom --- --- 0.003 --- --- -0.028*** --- --- -0.034 
   (0.795)   (0.000)   (0.345) 
Inflation  --- --- -0.001 --- --- -0.0001 --- --- -0.003* 
   (0.622)   (0.564)   (0.088) 
Public Investment  --- --- --- --- --- 0.005 --- --- 0.023 
      (0.489)   (0.307) 
          
Times Effects  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
AR(2) (0.750) (0.752) (0.896) (0.599) (0.592) (0.438) (0.925) (0.822) (0.299) 
Sargan OIR  (0.440) (0.432) (0.870) (0.439) (0.425) (0.980) (0.482) (0.536) (0.806) 
Wald (Joint) 175.84*** 176.70*** na 162.11*** 235.8*** 13693*** 169.02*** 243.70*** 1653.4*** 
Instruments  15 15 15 15 15 16 12 15 16 
Countries  17 17 10 17 17 10 17 17 10 
Observations  64 64 37 64 64 36 64 64 36 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test.  Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
 
Table 4: Legal origins (System GMM with Total Aid)  
          
 Panel A: English Common Law 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.755*** 0.759*** 0.679 0.847*** 0.831*** 0.340 0.949*** 0.880*** 0.312 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.398) (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) (0.000) (0.000) (0.125) 
Constant -0.276 -0.269* -0.149 -0.118 -0.077 0.674 -0.136 -0.076 1.104** 
 (0.114) (0.089) (0.889) (0.623) (0.718) (0.177) (0.273) (0.583) (0.027) 
Aid (NODA) 0.0004 --- 0.005 0.003** --- 0.017 0.006** --- 0.004 
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 (0.865)  (0.925) (0.030)  (0.496) (0.038)  (0.906) 
Tax revenues  0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.012 
 (0.411) (0.459) (0.968) (0.851) (0.757) (0.310) (0.667) (0.721) (0.394) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.0002 --- 0.000 -0.0009 --- 0.0001** -0.001 
  (0.694) (0.939)  (0.438) (0.167)  (0.026) (0.289) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.005 --- --- -0.023***  --- -0.029*** 
   (0.429)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.007 --- --- 0.020*** --- --- 0.035** 
   (0.710)   (0.004)   (0.015) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.058 --- --- 0.007 --- --- 0.072*** 
   (0.459)   (0.347)   (0.000) 
          
Times Effects  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
AR(2) (0.144) (0.162) (0.939) (0.340) (0.360) (0.439) (0.586) (0.564) (0.154) 
Sargan OIR  (0.436) (0.470) (0.994) (0.345) (0.264) (0.971) (0.736) (0.820) (0.999) 
Wald (Joint) 118.60*** 90.50*** 509.65*** 78.32*** 81.33*** na 1395*** 320.0*** 1576.7*** 
Instruments  15 15 16 15 15 15 15 15 16 
Countries  13 13 10 13 13 10 13 13 10 
Observations  48 48 36 48 48 36 48 48 36 
          
          
 Panel B: French Civil Law 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.806*** 0.911*** 1.100*** 0.825*** 0.797*** 0.549*** 0.797*** 0.843*** 1.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.395*** -0.161 -0.585** -0.210 -0.167 0.437*** -0.081 0.013 -0.512 
 (0.000) (0.380) (0.050) (0.318) (0.352) (0.006) (0.532) (0.920) (0.443) 
Aid (NODA) 0.007* --- 0.015* 0.003 --- 0.002 0.008* --- 0.026* 
 (0.085)  (0.093) (0.339)  (0.531) (0.073)  (0.055) 
Tax revenues  0.010** 0.008** 0.017*** 0.0005 -0.001 0.0001 0.005** 0.004 0.022*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.000) (0.773) (0.609) (0.967) (0.033) (0.269) (0.000) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.0001 --- 0.0001 0.000 --- 0.000 -0.0006 
  (0.734) (0.828)  (0.521) (0.740)  (0.677) (0.256) 
Press Freedom --- --- 0.003 --- --- -0.013***  --- 0.001 
   (0.493)   (0.005)   (0.900) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0001 --- --- -0.0001 --- --- 0.0002 
   (0.858)   (0.586)   (0.854) 
Public Investment  --- --- -0.006 --- --- -0.008 --- --- -0.018 
   (0.697)   (0.106)   (0.132) 
          
Times Effects  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.260) (0.217) (0.469) (0.722) (0.130) (0.168) (0.210) (0.224) (0.262) 
Sargan OIR  (0.165) (0.116) (0.321) (0.386) (0.382) (0.778) (0.344) (0.285) (0.421) 
Wald (Joint) 48.16*** 27.17*** 477.42*** 86.52*** 153.7*** 957.6*** 84.97*** 190.7*** 708.81*** 
Instruments  12 15 19 15 15 19 15 15 19 
Countries  28 28 20 28 28 20 28 28 20 
Observations  103 103 64 103 103 64 103 103 64 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
Table 5: Openness to Sea (System GMM with Total Aid) 
          
 Panel A: Landlocked Countries  
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.839** 0.873** 0.566 0.664*** 0.667** 0.411 0.858*** 0.865*** 0.891* 
 (0.039) (0.029) (0.270) (0.000) (0.013) (0.126) (0.000) (0.007) (0.035) 
Constant -0.419** -0.440 0.161 -0.469** -0.428 -0.461 -0.486** -0.296 -0.093 
 (0.049) (0.269) (0.733) (0.042) (0.253) (0.439) (0.020) (0.165) (0.930) 
Aid (NODA) -0.002 --- -0.041 0.006 --- 0.059 0.018 --- 0.0007 
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 (0.907)  (0.267) (0.570)  (0.154) (0.397)  (0.986) 
Tax revenues  0.008 0.008 0.001 0.007* 0.005 0.024* 0.012* 0.006 0.001 
 (0.319) (0.567) (0.897) (0.070) (0.430) (0.098) (0.058) (0.579) (0.934) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 0.0009 --- 0.000 -0.001 --- 0.0006 0.0004 
  (0.908) (0.225)  (0.803) (0.168)  (0.261) (0.773) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.007 --- --- -0.017** --- --- -0.003 
   (0.388)   (0.048)   (0.856) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.003 --- --- 0.014 --- --- 0.017 
   (0.626)   (0.156)   (0.219) 
Public Investment  --- --- --- --- --- 0.010 --- --- 0.005 
      (0.651)   (0.915) 
          
Times Effects  Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
AR(2) (0.266) (0.190) (0.850) (0.264) (0.377) (0.441) (0.956) (0.917) (0.369) 
Sargan OIR  (0.686) (0.735) (0.999) (0.579) (0.594) (0.869) (0.876) (0.870) (0.934) 
Wald (Joint) 212.61*** 178.16*** 442.18*** 63.37*** 33.31*** 464.41*** 48.27*** 48.01*** 412.90*** 
Instruments  15 15 18 12 15 16 15 15 16 
Countries  11 11 10 11 11 10 11 11 10 
Observations  41 41 35 41 41 35 41 41 35 
          
          
 Panel B: Not Landlocked Countries 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.737*** 0.734*** 1.063*** 0.920*** 0.918** 0.454*** 0.837*** 0.896*** 0.694*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.310** -0.252 -0.204 -0.037 -0.020 1.006*** -0.127 -0.061 1.019 
 (0.043) (0.114) (0.518) (0.783) (0.934) (0.000) (0.145) (0.496) (0.128) 
Aid (NODA) 0.004* --- 0.018* 0.003** --- 0.003 0.005*** --- 0.003 
 (0.053)  (0.061) (0.035)  (0.474) (0.000)  (0.809) 
Tax revenues  0.008** 0.007* 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0004 0.003** 0.002* 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.068) (0.137) (0.258) (0.413) (0.957) (0.036) (0.077) (0.776) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.0007 --- 0.000 -0.0001 --- 0.000 -0.0002 
  (0.210) (0.131)  (0.697) (0.580)  (0.126) (0.702) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.002 --- --- -0.022*** --- --- -0.019** 
   (0.697)   (0.000)   (0.049) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0003 --- --- 0.000 --- --- -0.0007 
   (0.738)   (0.915)   (0.552) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.009 --- --- -0.005 --- --- 0.014 
   (0.707)   (0.746)   (0.595) 
          
Times Effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.739) (0.780) (0.276) (0.271) (0.290) (0.522) (0.320) (0.411) (0.858) 
Sargan OIR  (0.235) (0.203) (0.232) (0.800) (0.447) (0.152) (0.850) (0.791) (0.168) 
Wald (Joint) 33.936*** 25.84*** 196.38*** 402.7*** 537.5*** 1903.1*** 116.1*** 48.44*** 2069.8*** 
Instruments  12 12 19 15 15 18 15 12 18 
Countries  30 30 20 30 30 20 30 30 20 
Observations  110 110 65 110 110 65 110 110 65 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
Table 6: Resources (System GMM with Total Aid) 
          
 Panel A: Oil Exporting Countries   
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.641*** 0.624*** na 0.633*** 0.604** na 0.661*** 0.652*** na 
 (0.006) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.011)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Constant -0.643 -0.742* na -0.414* -0.404* na -0.373* -0.450** na 
 (0.132) (0.068)  (0.071) (0.058)  (0.081) (0.035)  
Aid (NODA) -0.012 --- --- 0.010 --- --- -0.010 --- --- 
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 (0.614)   (0.295)   (0.661)   
Tax revenues  0.014** 0.016** na -0.003 -0.004 na 0.006* 0.007* na 
 (0.041) (0.026)  (0.459) (0.324)  (0.098) (0.070)  
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- -0.0002 na --- 0.0003 na --- -0.0002 na 
  (0.741)   (0.252)   (0.743)  
Press Freedom --- --- na --- --- na --- --- na 
          
Inflation  --- --- na --- --- na --- --- na 
          
Public Investment  --- --- na --- --- na --- --- na 
          
Times Effects  No No  No No  No No  
AR(2) (0.106) (0.110)  (0.994) (0.961)  (0.171) (0.177)  
Sargan OIR  (0.977) (0.987)  (0.968) (0.958)  (0.960) (0.967)  
Wald (Joint) 93.53*** 108.06***  33.23*** 30.48***  32.22*** 30.22***  
Instruments  12 12  12 12  12 12  
Countries  7 7  7 7  7 7  
Observations  22 22  22 22  22 22  
          
          
 Panel B: Non-Oil Exporting Countries  
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.737*** 0.734*** 1.083*** 0.920*** 0.918** 0.663*** 0.837*** 0.896*** 1.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.310** -0.252 -0.205 -0.037 -0.020 0.286* -0.127 -0.061 -0.236 
 (0.043) (0.114) (0.185) (0.783) (0.934) (0.081) (0.145) (0.496) (0.684) 
Aid (NODA) 0.004* --- 0.010* 0.003** --- 0.005 0.005*** --- 0.013 
 (0.053)  (0.088) (0.035)  (0.315) (0.000)  (0.156) 
Tax revenues  0.008** 0.007* -0.0002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003** 0.002* 0.0023 
 (0.019) (0.068) (0.932) (0.258) (0.413) (0.127) (0.036) (0.077) (0.502) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.000 --- 0.000 -0.0001 --- 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.210) (0.859)  (0.697) (0.366)  (0.126) (0.869) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.001 --- --- -0.011*** --- --- -0.001 
   (0.629)   (0.000)   (0.815) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0005 --- --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.0006 
   (0.321)   (0.782)   (0.441) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.015 --- --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.004 
   (0.371)   (0.988)   (0.832) 
          
Times Effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.739) (0.780) (0.966) (0.271) (0.290) (0.587) (0.320) (0.411) (0.996) 
Sargan OIR  (0.235) (0.203) (0.600) (0.800) (0.447) (0.563) (0.850) (0.791) (0.320) 
Wald (Joint) 33.93*** 25.84*** 1034.3*** 402.7*** 537.5*** 1346.7*** 116.1*** 48.44*** 1470.7*** 
Instruments  12 12 19 15 15 19 15 12 19 
Countries  30 30 26 30 30 26 30 30 26 
Observations  110 110 88 110 110 88 110 110 88 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
 
The study cannot conclude on the validity of the underlying hypothesis in Tables 5-6 based 
on the adopted information criteria for a substitution effect. Hence, the Eubank hypothesis is 
invalid in Africa (low-income and English common law countries of the continent) and the 
research cannot establish its validity for other fundamental characteristics of development. It can, 
therefore, be inferred from the findings that cross-country differences in legal origins and income 
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levels can elucidate the validity of the investigated Eubank hypothesis. It is important to articulate 
that while the analysis has controlled for time-invariant variables (i.e. years), dummy or fixed 
effects are eliminated by first differencing in order to control for endogeneity related to the 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and fixed effects (i.e. in the transition from 
Equation 1 to Equation 2). It follows that dummies cannot be involved in the system GMM as 
independent variables of interest and hence, the research found it plausible to take on board the 
relevance of legal origins and income levels by engaging multiple specifications.  
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications  
 This study has consistently noticed that foreign aid improves political governance. But 
since the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in some respects, the positive effect of foreign aid on 
political governance merits some emphasis. This informs the policy that, despite the substantially 
documented issues11 in donor countries that are currently affecting the flow of aid, its direct effects 
on political governance is appealing. Given that GMM estimates should be interpreted as short-
term effects because the research has used non-overlapping intervals to mitigate short-run 
disturbances that may loom substantially, it is logical to infer that foreign aid improves political 
governance in the short term. Two implications are noteworthy here. First, because the periodicity 
of the study covers the post ‘Berlin Wall’ era, it is fairly plausible to find a positive aid-governance 
nexus. Accordingly, donor objectives of foreign aid changed radically in the 1990s. Before the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, real politik was the name of the foreign aid game because the alleged prime 
objective of aid was to deter African nations from allying with the Soviet Union (Gibson et al., 
2014)12.  Second, consistent with Asongu (2013a, p. 14) foreign aid directly improves voice and 
accountability because it is an essential condition for its disbursement.  
 Assessing the Eubank hypothesis has improved the scholarly debates on the aid-institutions 
nexus in at least a threefold manner. First, by putting an empirical structure to the Eubank 
literature, the much needed guidance as to whether the Somaliland-based findings are relevant 
                                                          
11 See the following for some of the issues: Lagoutte & Reimat (2012), Contini (2012), Schäfer (2012), Zeddie 
(2013), Chapman (2013), Tamborini (2013) & Bruno (2013), inter alia.  
12 “The roots of the Washington consensus that grew in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War quickly changed this 
status quo: in addition to strong external pressure to liberalize, rulers began to face increasing constraints to using 
foreign aid to support their followers. While aid continued to flow, it came increasingly in forms far less amenable 
to patronage politics” (p. 25).  
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across Africa has been provided. This is in direct response to a request for further research by 
Eubank who has clearly warned that his findings should not be construed as reflecting the overall 
African context unless they are backed by some empirical evidence. Second, the research has taken 
the extant of knowledge on the drivers of accountable and representative governments to another 
platform. Therefore, the hypothesis of the dependence on tax revenues by government as an 
income channel to political accountability has been scarcely covered in the literature (Mahon, 
2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Moore, 2008; Prichard, 2009). Third, the scope of the 
problem statement has also provided an opportunity of extending a recent debate on aid and 
institutions by Okada & Samreth and Asongu & Jellal that has had a substantial influence on policy 
making and academic circles. The complementary effect of taxation and aid would be further 
increased if development assistance would be channeled through investment mechanisms and not 
via government final consumption expenditure (Asongu & Jellal, 2013).  
 The policy recommendations are valid only for political governance and should not be 
extended to economic (government effectiveness & regulation quality) and institutional 
(corruption-control & rule of law) governance without empirical justification. Based on the 
empirical underpinnings, the study has only invalidated the Eubank hypothesis in the short run. 
Hence, a long-term assessment is an interesting future research direction.  Moreover, in the 
appreciation of development assistance, the analysis has failed to distinguish between grants and 
concessional loans. Therefore, it is also worth assessing the dynamics of foreign aid that positively 
interact with tax effort to improve political governance. In addition, the research concurs with one 
of the referees of this paper on the position that, since of most of the data is obtained from the 
World Development Indicators, which could be noisy with regard to government finance, 
considering a new dataset recently presented by Mansour from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) would also be an interesting future research direction.  
 
4. Conclusion and future research directions 
This paper has put figures to the facts of Eubank (2012), a recently celebrated paper in the 
Journal of Development Studies. The research has investigated the underpinning Somaliland-
based hypothesis that foreign aid dilutes the positive role of taxation on political governance. 
While the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in baseline Africa, (low-income and English common law 
countries in the continent), the study cannot conclude on its validity for other fundamental 
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characteristics of development. This conclusion should not be assumed to be an extension of the 
heated debate on the recognition of Somaliland by the international community.  The objective of 
the paper has simply been to assess the empirical validity of the celebrated Eubank hypothesis.   
It is also interesting to note that the study has limited the analysis to the significance of the 
marginal effects given the context of the problem statement. While a range in foreign aid to GDP 
may not apply to Somaliland because the country is receiving no official development assistance, 
the Eubank hypothesis could be modified to assess in what range of the modifying variable (foreign 
aid) the substitution effect for the Eubank hypothesis holds. For the purpose of these thresholds of 
foreign aid, Brambor et al. (2006) would be instrumental for the graphical illustrations.  
Assessing whether the findings are relevant to other developing countries could also 
provide interesting insights for policy makers. Moreover, some exogenous socio-economic factors 
may affect the relationship between tax revenues and political governance. While foreign aid is 
considered within the framework of this study, other factors are also relevant. For instance, a 
country with a higher level of inequality may be expected to raise lower tax income. This 
dimension which is not considered in the study could be an interesting future research direction.  
Another worthwhile future research area could be to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
investigated Eubank hypothesis.  
 While some magnitudes of effects are small for some estimations, the research reported all 
the findings corresponding to the investigated hypothesis to avoid the concern of publication bias 
or “file drawer” problem in social sciences in which strong and significant findings are reported 
while weak and insignificant results are discarded (Rosenberg, 2005; Franco et al., 2014).  
Moreover, as argued by Boateng et al. (2018), weak and insignificant results may have as much 
policy relevance as strong and significant results.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Political Stability  Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate): Measured as  
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will  
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and  
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Voice & Accountability Voice and Accountability (estimate): Measures the extent  
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in  
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of  
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Political Governance  First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability  
PCA 
   
Tax revenues  Total revenues (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Foreign Aid (NODA) Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Foreign Aid (NODADAC) NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Tax.Aid  Product of Tax revenues and Foreign Aid World Bank (WDI) 
   
Press Freedom  Press Freedom Quality  Freedom House 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Inflation (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Public Investment  Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics and presentation of countries 
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
Political Stability (or No violence) -0.571 0.952 -3.229 1.143 265 
Voice & Accountability  -0.679 0.730 -2.161 1.047 265 
Political Governance (Polgov) -0.016 1.291 -3.204 2.621 264 
Tax revenues  26.746 12.798 3.760 93.633 189 
Foreign Aid (NODA) 10.889 12.029 0.015 102.97 253 
Foreign Aid (NODADAC) 6.278 7.303 -0.003 68.063 253 
Foreign Aid (NODAMD) 4.525 5.083 0.004 33.249 253 
Press Freedom  57.475 19.067 18.000 94.000 235 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
Public Investment 7.492 4.204 0.000 28.342 229 
      
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
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Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia. Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo 
Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. 
NODADAC: NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). MD: Multilateral Donors.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis 
           
PolSta VA Polgov Taxes NODA DAC MD Press Infl. Pub.I  
1.000 0.682 0.917 0.340 -0.105 -0.106 -0.093 -0.650  -0.098 0.274 PolSta 
 1.000 0.917 0.046 0.028 0.037 0.017 -0.919 -0.109 0.034 VA 
  1.000 0.207 -0.040 -0.036 -0.040 -0.848 -0.114 0.167 Polgov 
   1.000 -0.097 -0.068 -0.139 -0.120 -0.116 0.541 Taxes 
    1.000 0.975 0.946 0.049 -0.023 0.148 NODA 
     1.000 0.854 0.021 -0.011 0.128 DAC 
      1.000 0.078 -0.035 0.144 MD 
       1.000 0.150 -0.095 Press 
        1.000 -0.121 Infl. 
         1.000 Pub. I 
           
PolSta: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political governance. Taxes: tax revenues. NODA: Total Net 
Official Development Assistance (NODA). DAC: NODA from Development Assistance Committee (DAC). MD: NODA from 
Multilateral Donors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Category  Panels Countries Num 
 
 
Income-level 
   
Middle Income  Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome & 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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Legal Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & 
Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
33 
    
28 
 
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, 
Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, 
Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
43 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
38 
    
Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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